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Post-Cold War Continuities and Nuclear Weapons
The cascading events that transformed the face of world 
politics from the late 1980s aroused expectations that 
comparable changes might be at hand with respect to nuclear 
weapons Today nuclear weapons are by no means peripheral to 
the defense policies of the United States or other nuclear 
and aspiring nations To understand why it is necessary to 
look beyond the drama of recent events and focus on important 
continuities m  world politics Below I will argue that 
three central features of the Cold War period remain 
fundamental to the current politics of nuclear weapons the 
structure of the international system the management of 
deterrence and the basic doctrine of deterrence The passing 
of the Cold War has not altered the structure of the 
international system It follows that nuclear deterrence 
remains a valid — indeed essential— strategy for nuclear- 
capable states Given the risks posed by nuclear weapons the 
management of deterrence logically continues to be the 
primary task of policymakers Doctrinal continuity however 
inhibits the performance of this task by limiting the 
potential for deterrence management Specifically a nuclear 
doctrine which rests squarely on the capacity to do virtually 
untold damage is a poor basis for achieving a safer and more 
stable nuclear world
Structural Continuity
The collapse of communism m  Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union did indeed represent a remarkable series of 
changes that took the world by surprise With respect to 
armaments it seemed to many that for the first time there 
was at least a light at the end of the nuclear tunnel though 
how far it was might be disputed In the United States the 
debate that ensued (and still continues) marks a median shift 
away from the earlier consensus on the centrality of nuclear 
deterrence to the defense of the nation and its interests 1 
At one extreme stand those seeking the abolition of nuclear 
weapons at another those who advocate the continuation of 
existing policy m  between those who would de-emphasize 
nuclear weapons without abandoning them altogether A series 
of specific proposals m  the middle range envisaging the 
down-grading of nuclear weapons have explored such 
possibilities as global zero alert sharply reduced ceilings 
on deployment and more ambitiously virtual arsenals
From policymakers however the response has been far more 
cautious Notwithstanding the flurry of arms reduction 
agreements that more or less coincided with the end of the
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Cold War there has been no significant progress on US- 
Russian disarmament since the January 1993 signing of START 
II which still remains to be ratified by Russia s 
parliament Instead the focus has shifted to preventing 
proliferation ending tests and arresting the production of 
fissile material None of this involves de-emphasizing the 
weapons possessed by the recognized nuclear powers On the 
contrary the Defense Department s Nuclear Posture Review 
(NPR) completed m  the fall of 1994 continues to stress the 
centrality of nuclear deterrence m  the foreseeable future 
This is because m  terms of the structure of the
international system which constrains policymakers 
preferences not much has changed
In a nutshell the structure of the system has two 
characteristics anarchy and the distribution of 
capabilities 2 Anarchy or the absence of a sovereign 
authority that might regulate the system is the source of 
self-interested state action and the pursuit of power for 
security m  what is essentially a self-help system 
Capability distribution (unipolar bipolar multipolar) bears 
strongly upon certain broad characteristics of state 
behavior such as alliance politics as well as upon threat 
perceptions In the present era (both before and after the 
end of the Cold War) the effects of anarchy are constrained 
by two factors First high levels of economic mterdependece 
among some members of the system rule out the possibility of 
war among them Second high levels of strategic 
interdependence among nuclear-weapon states also make war too 
costly and therefore undesirable Thus the United States 
will almost certainly not be involved m  war with other 
developed countries or with other major nuclear powers 
particularly Russia In the latter case however the absence 
of war rests on continuing strategic interdependence which 
is the consequence of nuclear weapons In other words 
nuclear deterrence remains the basis of war-avoidance 
Anarchy however does not prevent the reduction of arsenals 
to achieve deterrence at significantly lower levels of 
armament As we shall see there are other reasons for the 
retention of excessive capabilities by both the United States 
and Russia
As regards capability distribution it is a common error to 
view Russia as a threat of the past The bottom line for 
prudent policymakers is that intentions can change so policy 
must be based on a potential adversary s capabilities Russia 
is still a nuclear power of great magnitude It is nowhere 
near being fully integrated into a network of economic 
interdependence with the United States and other developed 
countries Its political future is still uncertain and its 
tendency to flex its muscles vis-a-vis its small neighbors is 
a continual reminder of its past Given the inability of 
scholars and statesmen to predict the demise of the Soviet
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Union it would be myopic on the part of the United States to 
assume that the threat will not recur In the long term 
other potential threats lurk m  the background Should 
American capabilities be sharply reduced the Chinese arsenal 
would loom larger Beyond lie unknown possibilities which 
cannot altogether be discounted
In sum while there has been a great transformation at the 
historical level of global political events there is no 
significant change at the structural level From this 
standpoint nuclear deterrence retains its validity and there 
is no incentive for the United States to reduce its arsenal 
drastically On the contrary structural continuity begets 
operational continuity the weapons remain and the real task is to manage them
Continuity m  Managing Deterrence
During the Cold War the superpowers strategic relationship 
had two contradictory elements On the one hand mutual 
hostility caused them to be engaged m  an intense arms race 
with each aiming more and more and better and better 
weapons at the other both driven by fears of vulnerability 
On the other hand the immense destructive potential of their 
arsenals and the various costs and risks associated with 
these arsenals compelled the rivals to cooperate Following 
the Cuban missile crisis they began slowly to manage their 
strategic relationship Deterrence management encompassed 
several features chief among which were crisis prevention 
and management deterrence stability and safety
The prevention and management of crisis through improved 
communication was the immediate outcome of the missile 
crisis Deterrence stability was sought through ceilings on 
strategic arms as well as by relying on the doctrine of 
mutual assured destruction (MAD) of which an important 
component was the understanding that neither side would try 
seriously to defend itself from nuclear attack Towards the 
end of the Cold War the superpowers went so far as to agree 
on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles which had 
destabilized the deterrence relationship by among other 
things reducing response times m  the event of nuclear 
attack warning Deterrence management also enabled the rivals 
to try and control costs both countries were under serious 
economic pressure from the late 1960s owing to their heavy 
expenditures on defense By the time the Cold War came to an 
end the United States and the Soviet Union had begun to 
lower weapon ceilings still further dismantle obsolete 
weapons and focus increasingly on safety particularly on 
concerns relating to warning systems and accidental launches 
This process continued when Boris Yeltsin s Russia became the 
successor state to Mikhail Gorbachev s Soviet Union However 
the process has slowed down considerably since START II and
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Vit is important to know 
renewed dynamism
why m  order to infuse it with
Deterrence management can usefully be viewed as an
institutional or quasi-institutional process Its historical 
counterpart was the Congress System established by the 
European great powers at the Congress Of Vienna (1815) 
following the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte True the 
Congress System was not concerned with arms control but it 
was a quasi-formal institution aimed at managing strategic 
relationships among the great powers of the time Its purpose 
was to prevent great power war by means of a more or less 
institutionalized process of interaction that involved a good 
deal of compromise and give and take on strategic issues As 
such it was the source of systemic stability for a period of 
nearly four decades until the peace came to an end with the 
outbreak of the Crimean War (1853) followed by the wars of 
Italian and German unification I do not wish to carry the 
comparison too far The differences between the two processes 
are obvious not least because of the intervening nuclear 
revolution My point is that both processes are quasi- 
mstitutional aimed at systemic stability and directed 
toward mitigating the undesirable effects of systemic 
anarchy Both aim not so much at problem-solving as at 
managing potentially unstable relationships that could bring 
disaster if left unregulated The Congress System failed 
because the effects of anarchy— conflicting self-interest—  
ultimately prevailed There is a danger that for the same 
reason contemporary deterrence management will run into 
trouble if it has not already The risk of nuclear war 
ensures that deterrence management will not break down as a 
rational enterprise But that is not enough The chief 
problem today is to create the kind of strategic stability 
that will minimize the risk of accidental war
This can be done m  at least two ways by sharply reducing 
weapons ceilings (the fewer the weapons the greater the 
control) and by enhancing safety by stepping back from the 
rapid reaction postures that both superpowers currently 
retain Despite the termination of the Cold War neither has 
been done Both the United States and Russia are holding on 
to their rapid reaction postures which leaves their 
strategic relationship unstable 3 And because of Russian 
fears of vulnerability at lower ceilings of strategic weapons 
(echoing past--and present— American fears of strategic 
asymmetry) it is unlikely that significant reductions will 
take place 4 The reasons for these difficulties can be found 
m  a third form of post-Cold War continuity that of 
doctrine
Doctrinal Continuity
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Underlying the continuity m  nuclear postures is an unchanged 
doctrine MAD In one sense MAD is hard to criticize it 
does assure mutual deterrence m  so far as rational decision­
making is concerned However deterrence management also 
requires a high degree of safety and here lies the problem 
To achieve safety it is necessary to move away from rapid 
reaction postures and to try and lower weapon ceilings as far 
as possible MAD is an obstacle to both Because it requires 
very high levels of retaliatory capability asymmetry m  
destructive power is m v a n b l y  viewed as destabilizing The 
argument goes something like this if they launch a first 
strike we must be able to retaliate quickly with a high 
percentage of our weapons otherwise they may be willing to 
take the risk From this standpoint rapid reaction is 
absolutely essential Another sort of reasoning is no matter 
who strikes first our weapons must have a high level of 
damage expectancy otherwise they will not be (sufficiently) 
deterred In short asymmetry is intolerable In both cases 
the emphasis is on high levels of destructive capability 
This is decidedly odd The assumption is that the potential 
to inflict lower levels of damage will not deter the 
adversary Why should anyhmg less than the prospect of 
holocaust not deter'? Why is virtually incalculable 
destructive power necessary for deterrence'?
The preoccupation with big-ness (of power of damage) may 
have historical roots Industrial society and its progress m  
the twentieth century have tended to equate success with 
largeness m  resources m  production methods m  markets 
Military power by mid-century was monopolized by two 
countries of continental proportions with enormous resources 
which were translated effectively into large forces unmatched 
by other (smaller) industrialized states World War II saw 
the exercise of power on an unprecedented scale as m  the 
carpet bombing of Dresden and Tokyo which still did not end 
the war until the atomic bomb forced a tottering Japan to 
surrender unconditionally Perhaps all of this inculcated a 
faith m  size a belief that the adversary might withstand 
massive losses and the mind-set which produced arsenals 
possessing what can only be called a capacity for multiple 
overkill Perhaps too this is what persuaded a significant 
number of rational individuals that a nuclear war can be fought and won
Yet the capacity to inflict unimaginable damage need not be 
the basis for deterrence In the first place contemporary 
American and Russian societies are far from willing to 
tolerate large-scale casualties m  war 5 On the contrary it 
is not hard to believe that these societies (like any other) 
can be deterred by the threat of a relatively small amount of 
nuclear damage The British French and Chinese deterrents 
are constructed precisely on this calculus even a small 
retaliatory capability can deter because m  real terms
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